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Abstract 
The excessively expensive and inaccessibility to bank finance by many contractors for financing the construction 
industry among other factors explains the underdeveloped nature of the construction industry in Ghana. Trade 
credits which have been recognized in extant literature as both a substitute and complement to bank financing is 
also experiencing a market failure; yet, little to nothing is known about the constraints faced by supplier in 
extending trade credits to their contractors. This may lead to a weak reliance on findings from other economies 
for policy trade credit formulation. Nonetheless, contradictions about the cost of trade credit compared with bank 
finance and its position in the pecking order indicate that country-specific evidence is imperative. By adopting 
the Relative Importance Index (RII) aided by Principal Component Analysis (PCA) in analysing data collected 
from 75 SME construction merchants within the Kumasi metropolis of Ghana, the study concludes that three 
interwoven principal components: (1) Asymmetric Information (2) Weak Legal Environment and (3) Weak 
Macroeconomic Variables are the constraints to trade credit supply in Ghana. Asymmetric information is 
characterised by poor accounting standards and little education on trade credit; while the difficulty in enforcing 
the terms of trade credit contracts expand creditors’ risk constituting a weak legal environment. The high cost of 
financing materials acquisition underscored by high interest rates prices-out many buyers, which disincentivises 
the offering of trade credit. Theoretically, three trade credit models including the Agency Model, 
Financial/Liquidity Theory and the Marketing Theory are applicable in explaining the low levels of trade credit 
financing in Ghana. Practically, the paper provides a basis for budding appropriate trade credit policies and 
market in Ghana. Future research could concentrate on developing a framework for trade credit contracts in 
Ghana as well as developing mechanisms to overcome information asymmetry. We could further look at 
assessing the potential role of trade credit in the development of the Ghanaian construction industry, and how the 
establishment of a construction industry regulatory agency could promote the development of trade credit 
options.  
Keywords: Legal Environment, Trade Credit, Contract Enforcement, Constraints, Asymmetric Information. 
 
1. Introduction  
Access to credit by construction contractors is a significant constraint in the construction industry in many 
developing economies, and SMEs are the major victims (Abor and Quartey, 2010). In Nigeria, Adams (1997) as 
cited in Laryea (2010) identified uncertainties in supplies and prices of materials, obtaining interim payment, 
procuring work, access to capital, negotiating variation and payment, access to plant and equipment, transporting 
materials and equipment and accounting of financial management as factors influencing the performance of 
indigenous contractors. The Ghanaian landscape is replete with numerous studies that acknowledge financing 
constraint as a major setback for the construction industry (Bondinuba, 2012; Karley, 2009; Owusu, Badu and 
Edwards, 2008). Consequently, most contractors in developing economies are unable to satisfy the financial 
requirements including bid and performance bonds needed to win major contracts often awarded to their foreign 
counterparts. 
 
Most SMEs appear to be challenged in financing their business operations (Yeboah, Kumi and Awuah, 2012); as 
they face difficulties in accessing “traditional bank finance” from lenders. Bank financing is normally 
collateral-based, yet the legal and regulatory framework that guarantees lenders protection is adverse, amidst 
unfavourable macroeconomic fundamentals. This makes bank financing either unavailable to many SMEs or 
available at a high cost, which is not feasible sometimes. Although protracted, this is the situation in Ghana at a 
time when finance is needed to propel the recovering wheels of the economy from the global financial crisis. The 
search for alternative source of finance is prompting arguments in favour of trade credit financing; which was 
recognized as a major source of finance for firms with credit constraints during the crisis (Coulibaly, Sapriza, 
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Zlate, 2012; Levchenko et al., 2010). Trade credit – credit extended by a seller who does not require immediate 
payment for delivery of a product – is a very old practice, dating back to the Middle Ages. Thus, Couppey-
Soubeyran and Héricourt, 2011) show that the difficulty in gaining access to bank credit positively influences the 
use of trade credit, demonstrating the substitutability of bank credit and trade credit (Li, 2011; Alphonse, Ducret 
and Séverin, 2006).  
 
However, very little is practically and theoretical known about trade credit in the construction industry of Ghana.  
In fact, there is a desert of keen research on the dynamics of trade credit in Ghana, which renders the use of trade 
credit findings from other economies risky and misleading especially in trade credit policy formulation. This 
reveal considerable gap in the extant literature. For the purpose of pioneering and promoting TC channels as a 
very important form of funding for the Ghanaian construction industry alternate to bank financing, this study 
examined the constraints of SME construction merchants in supplying materials on credit to construction 
contractors in Ghana. This is necessary at this time due to the key role of trade credit in financial development 
(Couppey-Soubeyran and Héricourt, 2011). The study is presented in six parts: (1) an introduction to the study, 
(2) classification and characteristics of SME construction firms in Ghana, (3) constraints to TC supply, (4) 
methodology, (5) presentation and analysis of survey results and (6) practical observations for the development 
of TC policies and Market (7) conclusion. 
 
2. Small and Medium Construction Firms (SMCF) in Ghana: Classification and Characteristics  
There is no single, uniformly acceptable index for the classification of small and medium construction firms; 
rather classifications vary in respect of country, sector, industry and even the purpose of the classification. This 
is because no two firms are the same; firms differ in their sales, employment and levels of capitalization; hence, 
classifications are normally a matter of convenience.  For instance, Kayanula and Quartey (2000, p.9) observe 
that “definitions which employ measures of size (number of employees, turnover, profitability, net worth), when 
applied to one sector, could lead to all firms being classified as small, while the same size definition, when 
applied to a different sector, like the construction sector could lead to a different result” However, 
classifications are useful for management purposes especially at the national level.  
 
For this reason, the number of employees, value of assets, value of sales and size of capital as well as turnover 
are some familiar criteria used (Eyiah et al., 2003). Bondinuba (2012) acknowledges Bolton Committee (1971) 
as cited in Kayanula and Quartey (2000, p.7) as the maiden attempt to trounce this problem of definition by 
formulating an “economic” and “statistical” definition. Accordingly, a firm is regarded as small if it meets the 
following three criteria: 
 
“(1) Has a relatively small share of their market place; (2) Is managed by owners 
or part owners in a personalized way, and not through the medium of a formalized 
management structure; and (3) Is independent, in the sense of not forming part of 
a large enterprise”. 
Small firms therefore employ between 10 to 99 employees and medium firms between 100 and 200 employees. 
Using the value of fixed assets in the firm as an alternative criterion for defining SMCFs, Bondinuba (2012) 
indicates that small firms in industrialized countries employ 99 or less workers and medium firms employ 
between 100-499 workers.  In developing economies, small firms employ between 5-19 workers and medium 
firms employ between 20-99 workers (ibid.).  
 
In Ghana, The National Board for Small-Scale Industries (NBSSI) (1990) defines small and medium enterprise 
as one which employs not more than twenty-nine persons with plant and machinery value (excluding land, 
buildings and vehicles) not exceeding the equivalent of US$100,000. It again applies both the “fixed asset and 
number of employees” criteria and defines a small-scale enterprise as a firm with not more than 9 workers, and 
has plant and machinery (excluding land, buildings and vehicles) not exceeding 1 million Ghana Cedis. In 
relations to the construction industry, construction contractors are classified by the Ministry of Water Resources, 
Works and Housing (MWWOH) based on a number of guidelines, including the following: plant equipment 
holding, financial standing, previous performance and technical expertise into two main categories: (1) 'D' for 
general building works and (2) 'K' for civil works. Each category is sub-divided into four classes, ranging from 
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class D1, D2, D3, D4 and K1, K2, K3, K4. Class D3/D4 and K3/K4 contractors are commonly referred to as the 
small-scale building contractors and D1/D2 and K1/K2 are typically referred to as big firms. 
 
Adding, medium firms are registered as financial class 2 whiles small firms are financial class three (3). 
Financial class 2 firms are capable of undertaking projects up to US$ 500,000, while the financial class 3 firms 
are also capable of undertaking projects up to US$ 200,000 and class 4 to undertake projects up to US$75,000. 
Therefore, SMCFs in the Ghanaian context as it applies to the construction industry could be defined as a 
business or enterprise which, though mainly owner managed, employ between 5-10 and 100-200 people 
respectively and are pre-qualified and classified by MWWOH as D4 to D2 and class 4 up to class two (2). 
 
The construction industry was projected to grow at an unprecedented rate of 13.0% (ISSER, 2008). Typical in a 
modern society, around half of all physical assets are produced by the construction industry, engendering about 5 
- 10% of national wealth (Lopes, 2012).  This is the direct output of Small-Scale Building Contractors (SSBC) as 
this group constitute about 90% of the construction industry in Ghana (ibid.). Generally, Ganesan (1983) 
concurring note that small-scale firms account for over 90% of all construction firms in practically all countries. 
This suggests a dominance of SMCF in the construction industry in Ghana, which according to Wells (2007) is 
not a mishap. In fact, opine that construction is essentially a large industry of small firms in all construction 
economies (ibid.). Intrinsically, small-scale building contractors are a material part of the larger SMCF. 
 
Ahadzie (2007) describes these SSBCs as one-man enterprises, having low financial and capital base and also 
lacking the requisite managerial skills to adequately face up to the numerous and difficult challenges they 
constantly have to encounter in a typical developing economy such as Ghana’s. Their dominance according to 
Wells (2007) and Ganesan (1983) prescribe some special characteristics of the industry, such as the wide 
dispersion of the demand, flexibility in the scale of production, lack of standardization of materials, the effect of 
climatic controls on the use of materials, some of which can be very bulky; the low capital requirement for entry, 
especially for craft-based jobs. An issue of simultaneity is that the predominant business types determine the 
level of development of the industry. Perhaps, the dominance of SMCF in the Ghanaian construction industry is 
expected as the construction industry is underdeveloped and constrained by many factors which threaten growth 
and development.  
 
2.1 Constraints to Trade Credit Supply: A Theoretical Overview 
Suppliers face many constraints in extending TC. Bastos and Pindado (2009) recognized two dimensions of 
constraints to TC demand and supply. The first dimension being “the agency problem” and the second 
dimension, “countries’ Specificities”; which are discussed subsequently. 
 
The Agency Problem 
Bastos (2010) posit that the TC extended by suppliers to clients is a result of two phenomena, adverse selection 
and moral hazard. The phenomenon has been proposed and supported by many research studies, such as Cuñat 
and Garcia-Appendini (2012) and Kouvelis and Zhao (2012). Bastos (2010) noted that adverse selection arises 
when clients do not know ex-ante the quality of the goods they are going to buy, hence hypothesize that “the 
greater the presence of adverse selection in a relationship between sellers and buyers, the greater the trade 
credit offered”. From the suppliers end, when TC is extended, the risk of buyers not making the payment when it 
is due increases giving rise to the moral hazard phenomenon. The greater the presence of moral hazard in a 
relationship between sellers and buyers, the less trade credit offered (ibid.). The fact that in most cases, the 
contractors’ cashflow is unpredictable due to delays in honouring payment certificates (Laryea, 2010) makes 
construction firms more positive to the moral hazard phenomenon. Cuñat and Garcia-Appendini (2012) and 
Bastos (2010) concluded that, moral hazard and adverse selection are two phenomena that arise from sellers and 
buyers trading in conditions of asymmetric information.  
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Creditor Protection and Accounting Standards 
Bastos and Pindado (2009) explained that differences in creditor protection and the quality of accounting 
standards are the two country characteristics that may distinguish financial patterns of firms from different legal 
environments. According to the following arguments, high levels of creditor protection may mitigate the moral 
hazard costs, and high quality accounting systems mitigate information asymmetries and, consequently, moral 
hazard costs. Fosu (2014) and Galindo and Micco (2011) found evidence to substantiate the explanation of the 
significance of creditor rights in credit used by firms. Their conclusion is that countries with high levels of 
creditor rights have a larger credit market and vice-versa. Explicitly, countries whose legal systems accentuate 
creditor rights and contract enforcements have better developed banks (Skosples, 2012) whilst those with lower 
creditor protection present a high credit risk to lenders.  
 
Bastos and Pindado (2009) explained that asymmetric information between lenders and borrowers certainly 
influences the cost of the credit and its amount. The insufficiency of borrower’s financial information or the 
existence of unreliable or inaccurate information about them can lead financial intermediaries to reject credit 
demands or to increase their cost to compensate the risk (ibid.). Fisman and Love (2003) find a negative 
relationship between the poor accounting standards in a country and credit financing, indicating that the weaker 
the accounting information the higher the risk of lending for financial intermediaries. Bastos and Pindado (2009) 
concluded that, as in the case of creditor’s rights, the low quality of the accounting system will affect, with 
different intensity, both financial intermediaries and trade credit suppliers. Thus, the more information available 
about a borrower’s or a buyer’s financial situation, the cheaper the credit offered. Therefore, the quality in the 
accounting system will operate as a moderator in information asymmetries and, as a result, in the moral hazard 
phenomenon.  
 
3. Methodology 
Adopting quantitative methodology and a positivist approach, the study employs secondary data from the extant 
literature reviewed and primary data from survey questionnaire administration. The dataset obtained was limited 
to construction merchants in selected communities in the Kumasi metropolis via questionnaire survey. Kumasi is 
the capital of the Ashanti region of Ghana; which is centrally located in the middle belt of Ghana between 
longitudes 0.15°W and 2.25 W: latitudes 5.50 N and 7.46 N. With a population of about 2,035,064 (Kumasi 
Metropolitan Area), the study area is the second-largest city in the country. Employing a five-point closed-ended 
questionnaires and a snowball sampling technique, 75 construction merchants that have traded for more than 
three years were reached within four weeks. Out of which 67 representing 89% were fit for analysis.  
 
The Relative Importance Index (RII) was used in analyzing the relative importance of the constraints facing the 
supply of trade credit (TC) in the construction industry. In principle, the RII technique is employed when the 
respondent is asked to rank a list of predetermined factors in order of importance and relevance indicating his/her 
opinion, attitude or preference. Following the studies by Bastos and Pindado (2009) and Fishman and Love 
(2003) on the potential constraints to TC extension, nine (9) constraints were derived from the extant literature 
namely: (1) Little/scanty information on TC; (2) Poor accounting standards; (3) Total volume of material in 
store; (4) Risk of non-payment; (5) Cost of financing; (6) Poor creditor protection; (7) Interest on TC materials; 
(8) TC contract enforceability and( 9) Repayment terms. Hence, the RII allowed the surveyed construction 
merchants to rank these predetermined constraints of TC.  
 
Based on similarities in the latent characteristics of the TC constraints identified as well as the need to reduce the 
relatively large size of variables for the purpose of easy analysis, the Principle Component Analysis (PCA), a 
statistical data reduction technique was subsequently used to establish which variables were measuring aspects 
of the same underlying dimensions. PCA is useful for finding clusters of related variables into more easily 
understood framework. Three (3) principal components were extracted as the constraints to TC extension in 
Ghana by applying the Guttman-Kaiser rule and the Cattell scree test, Guttman-Kaiser rule suggests that only 
those factors with an eigenvalue larger than 1 should be retained, whilst the Cattell scree test suggests that all 
further components after the one starting the elbow should not be included.  
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4. Survey Results and Discussion 
4.1 Characteristics of Data  
The survey reveals that a substantial number of SME construction merchants (suppliers), representing 98 percent 
of total respondents face considerable degrees of constraints that impede their supply of TC. The severity of 
these constraints is such that all the nine constraints extracted from extant literature are significant according to 
the Relative Importance Index (RII) in Figure 1. The RII indicates that the difference between the highest (0.964) 
and lowest (0.63) ranking constraints is about 0.334. These constraints as presented in Table 1; these include (1) 
little information on TC as an alternate to bank loans (2) poor book keeping records of contractors (3) total 
volume of the TC material in store (4) problem of contractor defaulting on the repayment (5) high cost of 
obtaining finance for material acquisition (6) low creditor protection on defaulting contractors (7) 
interest/implicit tax on materials purchased (8) difficulty in enforcing TC contracts and (9) difficulty of 
formulating TC repayment terms.  This is further reduced into themes for easy inclusion into the RII chart as 
shown in Figure 1. 
Table 1. Constraints to Trade Credit Supply 
 
VARIABLES CONSTRAINTS TO TRADE CREDIT SUPPLY 
1. Little information on TC There is little information on TC as an alternate to bank 
loans 
2. Poor accounting standards There is poor book keeping records of contractors 
3. Total volume of material in 
store 
The total volume of the TC material in store 
4. Risk of non-payment There is the problem of contractor defaulting on the 
repayment 
5. Cost of financing The high cost of obtaining finance for material acquisition 
6. Poor creditor protection There is low creditor protection on defaulting contractors 
7. Interest on TC materials The interest/implicit tax on materials purchased 
8. TC contract enforceability The difficulty in enforcing TC contracts 
9. Repayment terms The difficulty of formulating TC repayment terms 
Source: Authors’ Description 
 
The data also shows that the number of construction merchants facing these constraints is positively correlated 
on average with the number of years in operation. In other words, as the number of years in operation increases, 
the number of construction merchants also increases. It is worthy to note that, the data in no way suggests a 
positive relationship between “degree” of constraint face by vendors  and the years of operation or the number of 
vendors within a particular age range. Rather, this finding could be attributed to the snowball sampling technique 
adopted for this survey. That is, most of the vendors surveyed have operated in the construction industry for 
more than ten (10) years. Thus, the distribution of the data is no indication of normality as would have been if 
the sampling technique was random. Figure 1 is a diagrammatic representation of the above discussion. 
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                                    Source: Survey (2014) 
 
4.2 Constraints to Trade Credit Supply in Ghana 
The nine identified constraints to trade credit supply in Ghana were reduced to three (3) principal components 
for easy analysis based on the similarities in their latent characteristics as per the Principle Component analysis 
(PCA) adopted; illustrated in Tables 2 and 3 below. The component names arrived at reflects aspects of all the 
variables classified under them. These are Component (1) – “Asymmetric Information”, Component (2) – “Weak 
Legal Environment” and Component (3) – “Weak Macroeconomic Variables”. The total variance explained by 
each component extracted is as follows:  The first principal component (component 1) accounted for 34.542% of 
the total variance whilst the second principal component (component 2) explained 19.063% of the remaining 
variation not explained by the first component.  The third component (component 3) accounted for 13.188%, of 
the remaining variation not explained by the first two components. Together, the 3 extracted components 
cumulatively explained 66.793% of the variation in the data set, and this meets the cumulative proportion of 
variance criterion, which says that the extracted components should together explain at least 50% of the 
variation. Table 2 and 3 below presents a snapshot of extraction process.  
 
Table 2. Total Variance Explained 
Component 
Initial Eigenvalues 
Extraction Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
Rotation Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
1 3.109 34.542 34.542 3.109 34.542 34.542 2.422 26.915 26.915 
2 1.716 19.063 53.605 1.716 19.063 53.605 1.860 20.663 47.577 
3 1.187 13.188 66.793 1.187 13.188 66.793 1.729 19.216 66.793 
4 .980 10.892 77.685       
5 .606 6.728 84.414       
6 .490 5.450 89.863       
7 .429 4.769 94.633       
8 .307 3.412 98.045       
9 .176 1.955 100.000       
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.      
Source: Authors’ Survey Estimation (2014) 
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Table 3: Component Matrix
a
 
Variable Component 
 1 2 3 
01.Little information on TC .744 .105 -.331 
02.Poor accounting standards .716 .401 -.047 
03.Total volume of material in store .690 .037 -.497 
04.Risk of non-payment .086 .832 .223 
05.Cost of financing .304 .728 .194 
06.Poor creditor protection .644 .261 .304 
07.Interest on TC materials .701 -347 -.096 
08.TC contract enforceability .689 .331 .289 
0.9.Repayment terms .292 .151 .745 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
a. 3 components extracted. 
Source: Authors’ Survey Estimation (2014) 
 
Component 1 - Asymmetric Information 
Asymmetric information as identified by this study as a constraint to SMEs is consistent with Ackah and Vuvor 
(2011). The phenomenon exists when there is an unequal degree of information to parties in a transaction, which 
may result in unfair exchange particularly in this case between construction merchants and construction firms 
due to adverse selection and moral hazards. Adverse selection in the purview of this study is the situation where 
construction merchants (vendor) engage in wrong (adverse) transactions based on wrong or inadequate 
information which could increase costs to them; while moral hazards results from default risk. In the first 
instance, the risk of non-payment (RII of 0.964) is the major constrain to TC extension. This is not mutually 
exclusive of the other factors as a closer look at the variables shows relationships. For instance, the risk of non-
payment is linked with the difficulty in formulating TC terms (RII of 0.919), poor accounting standards (RII of 
0.824) and little information on TC (0.719), which rank second and fifth respectively. 
 
The risk of non-payment increases moral hazards; the greater the presence of moral hazard in a relationship 
between sellers and buyers, the less trade credit offered (Bastos and Pindado, 2009). Standard credit assessment 
requires prospective borrowers to satisfy the five (5) lending criteria of capital, character, capacity, collateral and 
condition. The qualities of a good borrower therefore is that; (1) a person of good character who will pay back 
the loan; (2) has capacity to pay; (3) demonstrate capital and wealth to have a financial stake in the property; (4) 
show evidence of collateral security; (5) and be able to honour the mortgage agreement in all conditions under 
the terms. The character and capacity of a construction firm to repay a given trade credit is a function of its 
accounting records. Hence, a poor accounting standard is an indication of poor character and capacity; and vice 
versa. The survey reveals that poor accounting standards (ranked 5th) by construction firms is a major constrain 
to vendors’ desire to extend trade credit; as the degree of poor accounting could influence substantially vendors’ 
costs due to adverse selection. This could result from the difficulty of vendors in assessing default tendencies 
(the risk of non-payment). There is therefore a negative correlation between the weak accounting standards in 
Ghana and trade credit financing, which reinforces the finding of Fisman and Love (2003).  
The difficulty in formulating TC terms presupposes the non-existence of TC standards, which is closely linked 
with the fact that there is little information on TC in Ghana. Both construction merchants and borrowers 
technically know little about TC as a substitute and/or complement for bank loans and also a cash flow 
management technique tool. For this reason, the market for TC is underdeveloped. There is a lack of a TC 
assessment process as well as a specific legal environment to support TC transactions. A standardized TC 
assessment process would determine the necessary documentation, the credit worthiness of the construction firm, 
repayment term and discount rate required for TC extension. The determination of these parameters requires 
some level of technical expertise; yet, most of the construction merchants are illiterates or semi-literates. The 
lack of a certain environment expands TC risk. Moreover, since TC is based on a contract, it comes with 
transaction costs in the form of legal fees. When TC is extended and the buyer defaults, the supplier will support 
all costs generated by the sales, hence the higher the percentage of variable costs of the goods sold. 
Consequently, the decision to extend TC depends on whether the marginal profitability is greater than the 
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associated marginal opportunity cost (Bastos and Pindado, 2007). Therefore, when a firm decides to extend its 
credit policy it is probably expecting a sales increase and, hence, the firm is prepared to assume new costs such 
as collection costs, bad debt losses and variable costs. Thus, the credit policy decision involves a trade-off 
between profits from marginal sales and their marginal costs.  
 
Consequently, the substantial uncertainties involved in extending TC as a result of excessive asymmetric 
information, construction merchants ultimately face high adverse selection in assessing potential cost in 
extending TC to SMCFs; subsequently making the determination of possible profit complicated. Hence, many 
construction merchants face excessive adverse selection, which could ultimately result in unanticipated costs 
upon borrowers’ default. Cost may manifest in three forms: (1) bad debts (2) opportunity cost of capital involved 
in purchasing the construction materials. That is, the possible interest that could have been earned should the 
seller have put the capital in another investment of equal risk (3) interest payment on loans used in purchasing 
the construction materials, which is applicable if debt was involved. 
 
Total volume of materials in store (inventory size) held by merchants is also a potential barrier to TC extension 
(ranked 7th). To fully explain TC provision by firms, the product characteristics theory and the inventory 
management model of trade credit are necessary. Though suppliers facing an uncertain demand for their products 
face an incentive to extend trade credit to their financially constrained customers in order to promote sales rather 
than accumulate costly inventories of finished goods; this incentive is only limited by the need to obtain liquidity 
to meet their own obligations, hence producers might readily offer trade credit on appropriate terms only to 
enhance cash sales and boost demand. According to Kot, Grondys and Szopa (2011), the location of maintaining 
main stock in the supply chain depends on a number of factors, including in particular the (1) sector, (2) 
character of the product and (3) the market environment (competitors, customers). 
 
In terms of sector and product characteristics, the construction sector usually deals in “durable” and “non-
perishable goods”. In a way, the very nature of these goods allows construction merchants to keep inventory for 
a relatively longer period of time if there is no immediate effective demand, thereby restricting the extension of 
TC. This is normally in anticipation that subsequent purchasers would provide the needed liquidity or better 
terms than giving goods out `on TC basis, especially when the risk of non-payment and difficulty in determining 
TC terms exist. Moreover, the construction merchants surveyed are fairly old and large and therefore are able to 
hold higher volumes of stock as compared to their younger counterparts. This means that, suppliers are able to 
hold a certain limit of inventory and once this limit is not attained, they might not extend TC to firms when there 
is no urgency to promote sales. In other words, the size of inventory a merchant can hold is a basis for extending 
TC. 
 
A contrary argument is that small scale merchants with low volumes of inventory may not be attracted to the TC 
market. Their small sizes suggest that inventory could be cleared within short intervals of time all things equal. It 
is also possible that such low volumes of inventory could be cleared by few transactions either by immediate 
cash sales or TC. Extending TC may result in selling a chunk of their inventory on credit; and in extreme cases 
100% of their inventory could be on credit. The problem with this situation is that, within the short-term waiting 
period, these merchants may be out of business (probably not open the shops) because of the short-term liquidity 
problem. This is against the backdrop of enormous difficulty in accessing bank finance by these small-scale 
construction merchants. Liquidity to construction merchants is therefore a very useful decision tool in extending 
TC to borrowers, a clear indication that the Financial/ Liquidity Theory of TC is applicable in explaining the low 
levels of TC in Ghana. That is firms with better access to the capital market or external financing are most likely 
to advance TC to clients facing credit constraints and vice versa. Undoubtedly, almost all construction merchants 
in Ghana do not have access to the capital market and external financing is limited. Hence, extending TC to 
clients is not attractive without certainty of repayment.  
 
In addition, the low levels of TC as it relates to inventory size could be attributed to the market environment in 
Ghana, which could be described as adverse. Two principles, scarcity of construction materials and the lack of 
competition among suppliers of construction materials explain this phenomenon. Some studies report about the 
reliance of the construction industry especially the real estate sector on import raw and finished materials. Harsh 
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macroeconomic indicators mean that only a few construction merchants could participate in this market; hence, 
creating possible shortages and limited choices for buyers, which could lead to preferential sales like non-
extension of TC. This is worsened by the lack of competition among construction merchants. For this reason, 
sellers are not motivated to put in measures such as offering TC in order to protect their customer base; thus, 
confirming the Market Theory of TC.  
 
In summary, the constrain of asymmetric information supports the Agency Model of TC  extension (Bastos and 
Pindado, 2007). According to this model, TC policies are defined by a trade-off between two agency costs: 
adverse selection and moral hazard. They concluded that “Trade credit demanded and extended by firms is a 
result of the influence of internal factors (such as the moral hazard, the adverse selection, the bargaining power 
and the investment opportunities presented by the customer firm) and is also influenced by some external factors 
that characterize the legal and the economic environment (such as the level of creditor protection, the accounting 
standards and the economic situation)”, which factors have been discussed above.  
 
                   
 
Sources: Survey (2014) 
 
Component 2 - Weak Legal Environment 
Two main constraints to TC supply, (1) TC contract enforceability and (2) poor contract protection are discussed 
under the weak legal environment. It should be noted that Levine (2002) finds a correlation of creditor protection 
to contract enforcement and hence one of these variables cannot exist in isolation. By this reason, little difference 
was anticipated between the two variables with reference to the RII. However, the difficulty in enforcing TC 
contracts ranked 4th with RII of 0.845 whiles poor creditor protection ranked 9th with an RII of 0.63. By the 
ranking, the difference is quite striking but the actual RII values depict quite a small difference, which supports 
their correlation.   
 
Schwartz (1974) argues that the exploitation of TC by both buyers and sellers centers on the aim to reduce the 
cost of doing business. The supply of TC could be improved in an environment with strong contract 
enforceability rights; as such environments enhance creditors’ protection. Hence, the high moral hazards and 
adverse selection costs resulting from the high asymmetric information in the TC market could be salvaged in an 
environment with strong contract enforceability rights. According to Bastos and Pindado (2007) high levels of 
creditor protection may mitigate the moral hazard costs. However, the legal regime in Ghana is adverse coupled 
with bureaucracies that increase the cost of enforcement as against potential benefits.  
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The complexity in enforcing TC contracts could emerge from the “difficulty of formulating TC repayment 
terms” – ranked second with an RII of 0.919; as it is these terms that binds and validates the relationship that a 
seller would normally evoke the powers of the law courts to enforce. This difficulty may therefore emanate from 
the complexity of what constitutes a valid, binding and enforceable contract; which most of the construction 
merchants surveyed are not privy to. This would not be a problem but for the high cost involved in engaging the 
services of lawyers. High TC transaction volumes means more work for the legal expert, hence, the impetus to 
negotiate reduction in legal, and for that matter a reduction in the average legal cost in documenting TC contracts 
below possible sales and revenue. Nonetheless, TC transaction volumes are low, increasing average legal cost 
above possible sales and revenue.  
 
Extra cost is generated from evoking the right to resort to the courts of law to enforce TC transactions upon 
borrowers’ default. These particular cost only given the unnecessary bureaucracy in the Ghanaian legal system 
could be very high above possible sales and revenue; subsequently making it uneconomical to enforce a TC 
contract. Delays in the court system could increase the accrued interest on capital and cost of financial distress 
(i.e. moral hazard cost), if borrowed as well as increase the likelihood of bankruptcy of construction merchants. 
Given the likelihood of non-payment, high average cost involved in documenting TC transactions and the 
adverse legal system, TC is not attractive because it is more cost saving not to engage the legal system because 
of TC transactions. In other words, the cost of extra-legality; that is, not resorting to the courts of law is less 
expensive than engaging the courts. The situation could be more strenuous for invalid, non-binding and 
unenforceable contracts; which is the likely scenario because of the difficulty in determining the terms of TC 
contracts. Therefore, the adverse and expensive legal system in Ghana subsequently provides no or little 
guarantee for creditor protection; thus, a disincentive to the extension of TC.  
 
Further, one of the ways to mitigate trade creditor’s risk is to seize the goods and sell them upon buyers default 
to pay for them. However, a weak legal environment makes this difficult thereby affecting the trade creditor’s 
risk (Bastos and Pindado, 2007). Therefore, adding a new argument to the proposed trade-off between adverse 
selection and moral hazard; depending on the level of creditor protection in a country, the cost of moral hazard 
can oscillate. It is consequently expected that trade credit would be lower in countries with lower creditor 
protection, endangering a positive relation between TC financing and creditor rights protection because the latter 
could moderate the moral hazard phenomenon. 
 
This explanation has theoretical support in La Porta et al., (1997), Levine, (2002), Galindo and Micco (2007), 
and Djankov et al., (2007) who point out that the low level of creditor protection becomes more relevant in the 
development of credit markets during bankruptcy. Naturally, we can broaden this reasoning to a trade credit 
relationship between firms in the case of buyers presenting a high risk of bankruptcy. Thus, the level of 
creditors’ protection will be more important to the development of trade credit markets along the supply chain 
when buyers’ risk of bankruptcy is high. The inclusion of the level of creditor protection as a moderator of the 
moral hazard phenomenon and consequently as an indirect determinant of the trade credit extended also finds 
support in Pindado et al. (2008), who find that insolvency codes play a crucial role in investment decisions.  
 
Consequently, the Ghanaian credit market is relatively small, supporting the observation that countries with high 
levels of creditor rights have a larger credit market (including better developed banks) and vice-versa (La Porta 
et al., 1997; Levine, 2002; Galindo and Micco, 2007; and Djankov et al., 2007).  
 
 
Component 3 - Weak Macroeconomic Indicators 
The “high cost of financing material acquisition” and “interest/implicit tax on TC provided” are the two 
variables underpinning the weak macroeconomic environment as a reason for the low levels of TC in Ghana. 
High cost of borrowed funds is not necessarily the restrictor but excessive cost of debt above borrowers’ ability 
to afford. Excessive interest rates averaging 30% per annum on borrowed funds used in acquiring construction 
materials in Ghana could reduce the supply of TC indirectly. First, the high cost of debt financing reduces 
expansion potential as construction merchants can afford to purchase a few materials, which rolls in the early 
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submission about small-scale construction merchants. Small-scale construction merchants usually have low 
volumes of inventory which could be cleared in short intervals of time by cash sales or TC transactions. 
Extending TC could lead to liquidity problems and consequent asset-liability gaps, which could restrict the 
supply of TC.  
 
Excessive cost of debt financing also limits the ability of construction merchants to access the capital market and 
for that matter other sources of debt financing both internal and external; hence, confirming the 
Financial/Liquidity Theory of TC. This is the particular case of construction merchants in Ghana in the face of 
an underdeveloped capital market and little sources of capital. Emery (1984) postulated that credit rationed firms 
use more trade credit than those with normal access to financial institutions. Bastos and Pindado (2007) explain 
that the central point of this notion is that when a firm is financially constrained the offer of TC can make up for 
the reduction of the credit offer from financial institutions. In accordance with this view, those firms presenting 
good liquidity or better access to capital markets can finance those that are credit rationed, they conclude. Hence, 
from the supplier’s point of view, the financing theory suggests that firms having access to internal (cash flows) 
and/or external finance (e.g. bank loans) may be more inclined to offer TC to their customers (Giannetti et al., 
2008; Petersen and Rajan, 1997).  
 
Financial scholars including Nadiri (1969); Petersen and Rajan (1997); Wilner (2000); Isaksson (2002); and 
Cunat (2007) establish that these suppliers (construction merchants) may offer TC to financially constrained 
customers if they expect future benefits from increasing sales to these customers. Since the absence of an 
evidence-based to support the profits of higher sales, construction merchants are unlikely to extend TC. Whiles 
the high risk of non-payment exist as identified earlier, construction merchants are likely to sustain a high cost of 
financial distress and moral hazard costs. Therefore supporting the assertion that the more extensive the credit 
granted, the greater the amount of bad debt losses the seller is likely to sustain and vice versa (Marotta, 2005). In 
this case, instead of debt enhancing investment returns in line with corporate finance principles, such debts 
accrue more debt to the seller; the case is even worse in high interest rate economies like Ghana. 
 
Further, macroeconomic instability increases the interest/implicit tax on TC extended to buyers; when buyers 
choose the two-part payment model; which may price-out buyers and hence reduce the supply of TC. The two-
part payment model involves the offering of a ‘goodwill’ discount if payment is made within the discount period, 
or full payment is made at the end of the net period. A common variant of the latter is “2/10 net 30”. The “2/10” 
means that buyer gets 2% discount for payment within 10 days. The “net 30” means that, in case the buyer does 
not take the 2% in 10 days, the full payment is due in 30 days. Empirical analyses by Petersen and Rajan (1997), 
Ng et al (1999) and Wilner (2000) reveal that the fact that the buyer in some cases prefers to delay payment extra 
20 days rather than to take the 2% discount, defines an implicit annual interest rate of 43.9% making TC in this 
case more expensive than bank loans. 
 
The study of trade credit during economic crisis periods is also an important topic (Bastos, 2010), particularly 
when the global economy is going through a credit shock. Regarding the recent 2008 global crisis, Kazmin, et al. 
(2008) argues that the reluctance of commercial banks to lend caused a liquidity shock at every level of the 
system. This liquidity shock caused a shift in trade credit use levels because on the one hand, trade credit may 
act as a substitute source of funds and thus increase, but on the other hand, trade credit may complement bank 
credit and decrease (Bastos, 2010). The actual situation in Ghana during the global financial crisis was critically 
dependent on the effect of contagion; arguable minimal. In this vein, TC was not necessarily a substitute as the 
banks were still lending. Rather, TC was likely to serve as a complement to bank finance and decease as reported 
by Owusu-Manu, Edwards and Donkor-Hyiaman in an independent study in 2013 and thus, explains the low 
levels of TC in Ghana. 
 
In conclusion, the inventory effect is independently minimal in explaining the low levels of TC in Ghana. This is 
because, a mixture of other factors including the high risk of non-payment, scarcity, illiquidity and the lack of 
competition among on construction merchants are important tools in extending TC notwithstanding the size of 
inventory.  
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4.3 Some Practical Observations for Developing the Trade Credit Market and Policies in Ghana  
 
In term of cost, both construction merchants and borrowers are highly likely to sustain substantial cost if TC is 
extended. This is largely because, there is greater uncertainty regarding TC financing compared with bank 
financing; as the latter has relatively better lending processes and infrastructure supported by specific legislative 
instruments and better corporate governance beside others; which makes it correspondingly less risky to TC 
financing. For this reason, TC in Ghana is better considered a complement and not necessarily a substitute to 
bank financing. Moreover, the low levels of TC is a signal about the poor quality of firms as implied from 
Alphonse, Ducret and Séverin (2006). Therefore trade credit is a tool for improving borrowers’ reputation.  
 
In developing the TC market, TC market infrastructure that largely seeks to bridge and improve asymmetric 
information should be developed. This would include borrowers adopting better accounting standards and 
building stronger relationships with construction merchants. This study did not examine the relationships 
between construction merchants and construction firms; and how this relationships could influence the supply of 
TC – a possible weakness of the study. Trade relationships has been recognized by Couppey-Soubeyran and 
Héricourt (2011) as a primary driver of trade credit for financial development, and does not appear any more as a 
palliative solution when bank credit access is difficult. 
 
Further development of the capital market has the potential of increasing the funding options for SME 
construction merchants. An improved access to the capital market and external financing according to the 
financial/liquidity theory of TC would enhance the extension of TC. Access to the capital market would also 
require some level of expansion of construction vendors (merchants). As they grow in capitalization and size, 
their liquidity position would be enhanced, which would improve the possibility of supplying TC to relatively 
smaller construction firms. The current situation suggests that construction merchants are probably smaller than 
borrowers (construction firms), hence the difficulty in extending TC as implied from Marotta (2005).  
 
Last but not the least, developing the TC legal environment by standardizing TC contracts would make it easy 
for construction merchants to determine the terms of TC contracts. Such a document should be developed and 
made easy understandable to these merchants who are predominantly illiterates or semi-literates; as well as 
administered by them. By allowing them to administer this lending contracts, legal cost could be eliminated or 
substantially reduced. This would inject some certainty and clarity into TC transactions; perhaps, reduce high 
legal costs associated with TC documentation. This is possible by registering construction merchants with the 
Bank of Ghana as lenders, who may operate under the Lenders and Borrowers Act and/or a special legal 
instrument for TC transactions.  
 
4.4 Conclusion  
Marotta (2005) opine that older and larger firms provide higher TC limit than their younger and smaller 
counterparts. Coincidentally, construction merchants in Ghana are predominantly SMEs who provide little to no 
TC to their customers. Trade credit is a useful innovation in the financing of the construction industry world-
wide. It is a viable alternative to the traditional industry financing technique which holds substantial potential in 
de-stressing the use of bank financing, usually priced on the high side to the detriment of industry in Ghana. In 
addition, TC is an instrument for retaining customers; securing future cash flow; sharing risk; clearing old stock; 
trading policy; interest charges; transaction charges; and building relationship. However, the use of TC is yet to 
prove as a viable alternative to bank financing because of three principal constraints to TC supply: (1) 
Asymmetric information, (2) weak legal environment and (3) weak macroeconomic variables. 
 
Asymmetry information manifests in the form of poor accounting standards and scanty information on TC which 
makes the assessment of TC default risk inaccurate and unreliable, disincentivizing sellers to engage in TC. 
There is somewhat difficulty in determining what constitutes a valid, binding and enforceable terms of TC 
contracts.  Subsequently, enforcement becomes problematic, exposing sellers to credit risk and less protection 
for TC creditors. Lastly, the weak macroeconomy underpinned by the high cost of financing material acquisition 
expands credit risk. This is particularly true in the face of poor accounting standards making the assessment of 
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buyers’ creditworthiness difficult. These constraints explain the low levels of TC in Ghana. In summary, the 
analysis made in this study support the two dimensions of the constraints to TC demand and supply: (1) agency 
problem and (2) country specificities as theorized by Bastos and Pindado (2007).  
 
The study provides enough empirical evidence to support three TC theories: (1) Agency Model (2) 
Financing/Liquidity theory and (3) Marketing Theory. There is however, not enough evidence from the data to 
support the Transaction Cost and Tax Theories of TC. For instance, we need data on the size of sellers and 
buyers, the tax brackets of sellers and buyers, and the frequency of transaction between sellers and buyers to 
make reasonable conclusions about the applicability of the Tax and Transaction theories respectively in Ghana. 
Nonetheless, this is not to say that, these theories do not apply to Ghana. Until tested, the findings provide an 
evidence to support the assertion that all TC theories are not applicable to all economies and therefore heighten 
the need for country-specific evidence of the applicability of TC theories for the formulation of TC policies. 
Future research could concentrate on developing a framework for trade credit contracts in Ghana as well as 
developing mechanisms to overcome information asymmetry.  
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